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Abstract—Proof of work (PoW), the most popular consensus
mechanism for Blockchain, requires ridiculously large amounts
of energy but without any useful outcome beyond determining
accounting rights among miners. To tackle the drawback of PoW,
we propose a novel energy-recycling consensus algorithm, namely
proof of federated learning (PoFL), where the energy originally
wasted to solve difficult but meaningless puzzles in PoW is
reinvested to federated learning. Federated learning and pooled-
ming, a trend of PoW, have a natural fit in terms of organization
structure. However, the separation between the data usufruct
and ownership in Blockchain lead to data privacy leakage in
model training and verification, deviating from the original
intention of federal learning. To address the challenge, a reverse
game-based data trading mechanism and a privacy-preserving
model verification mechanism are proposed. The former can
guard against training data leakage while the latter verifies the
accuracy of a trained model with privacy preservation of the task
requester’s test data as well as the pool’s submitted model. To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first work to employ
federal learning as the proof of work for Blockchain. Extensive
simulations based on synthetic and real-world data demonstrate
the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.
Index Terms—Blockchain, consensus mechanism, federated
learning, reverse game
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain, disrupting the current centralized models, is
heralded as the next paradigm innovation in digital networks,
which opens a door to uncharted cyberspace with ever-
increasing security, verifiability and transparency concerns.
The performance of Blockchain heavily relies on the adopted
consensus mechanisms in terms of efficiency, consistency,
robustness and scalability. The aim of consensus mechanisms
is orchestrating the global state machine so as to agree on the
order of deterministic events and screen out invalid events.
Undisputedly, the most popular consensus mechanism is PoW,
which is adopted by two mainstream Blockchain systems,
namely Bitcoin and Ethereum.
PoW determines accounting rights and rewards through
the competition among nodes (miners) to solve a hard cryp-
tographic puzzle by brute-forcing, which is called mining,
an extremely computation-hungry process. It is reported that
the total electricity consumption of Bitcoin is comparable to
that of Austria annually; the electricity that a single Bitcoin
transaction expends is equal to 22.32 U.S. households powered
for one day [1]. The energy-wasting way of PoW deviates from
the sustainable and environment-friendly trend for current
technology development, thus diluting its value and hindering
its further application.
To tackle the drawback of PoW, researchers proposed solu-
tions from two different perspectives: energy-conservation and
energy-recycling. Proof of stake (PoS) [2] and voting-based
consensus algorithms [3] are typically energy-conservation
approaches. They economize on energy by cutting down the
mining difficulty of rich stakeholders or their delegates. Non-
democracy is an obvious side effect of these approaches since
they have a bias toward wealthy peers. Furthermore, their
mining process, even with reduced difficulty, is still considered
as waste on useless computation.
Energy-recycling consensus algorithms address the energy-
wasting issue of PoW from a different angle. They recycle the
energy which is originally employed to solve cryptographic
puzzles for useful tasks. For instance, the mining energy
can be repurposed for finding long prime chains [4], matrix
computation [5], image segmentation [6] and deep learning
[7]. The idea of energy-recycling consensus algorithms, i.e.,
turning the meaningless proof of work into practical tasks for
completing the consensus of Blockchain, undoubtedly deepens
the integration of Blockchain and other fields, expanding the
application scope of Blockchain.
In this paper, we propose a novel energy-recycling con-
sensus algorithm: proof of federated learning (PoFL), where
the energy originally wasted to solve difficult but meaningless
puzzles in PoW is reinvested to federated learning. Federated
learning [8] is a distributed machine learning approach, with
the idea of bringing code to data rather than the reverse di-
rection. In federated learning, a high-quality model maintained
by a central server can be learned through aggregating locally-
computed updates, which are sent by a loose federation of
participating clients. Since the local training dataset of each
client will not be sent to the central server, privacy and security
risks are significantly reduced.
Besides PoFL can inherit the advantage of energy-recycling
consensus algorithms, we propose it also because PoW and
federated learning have a natural fit in terms of organization
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structure. Due to the huge difficulty for individual mining,
pooled-mining becomes a trend of PoW, where miners join
pools, gathering their computational power, to figure out the
cryptographic solution and then the pool manager of each pool
allocates rewards proportionally to each miner’s contribution.
In other words, both pooled-mining and federated learning has
a clustering structure. Thus, when the cryptographic puzzle
in PoW is replaced with federated learning, the cluster head,
namely the pool manager, can coordinate the locally-computed
results updated by pool members (miners) to form a high-
quality model.
However, the fit of the organization structure does not imply
it is non-trivial to realize PoFL. In detail, the merit of federated
learning lies in that all clients collaboratively train a high-
quality model while keeping their training data private from
others, where the usufruct and ownership of local training
data is an integration. However, the openness of Blockchain
endows anyone with the right of mining, i.e., the local model
training in PoFL, which results in the separation between the
data usufruct and ownership. This may lead to data privacy
leakage in model training and verification, deviating from the
original intention of federal learning.
Our paper aims to address the above challenge so that PoFL
can meet practical demands. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first work to employ federal learning as the
proof of work for Blockchain, where the main contributions
are summarized as follows:
• A general framework of PoFL is introduced, which
clarifies the interaction among all entities involved and
designs a new PoFL block structure for supporting block
verification so as to realize the consensus for Blockchain.
• A reverse game-based data trading mechanism is pro-
posed to leverage market power for guarding against
training data leakage. This mechanism can determine
the optimal data trading probability and pricing strategy
even when a pool conceals his1 profit from privacy
disclosure. Driven by the proposed mechanism, a pool
with a high risk of privacy disclosure has a low data
trading chance and needs to pay a high purchase price,
which further incentivizes pools to train models without
any data leakage.
• A privacy-preserving model verification mechanism is
designed to verify the accuracy of a trained model while
preserving the privacy of the task requester’s test data
as well as the pool’s submitted model. The proposed
mechanism consists of two parts: the homomorphic en-
cryption (HE)-based label prediction and the secure two-
party computation (2PC)-based label comparison.
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. In
Section II, we introduce an overview of our proposed PoFL. To
cope with the training data exchange between data providers
and pools, we proposed an incentive-compatible data trading
mechanism based on the reverse game in Section III. In order
1We denote the pool as “he” and the data provider as “she” for differenti-
ation in the following.
to calculate the accuracy of model without disclosing either
the test data or the model itself, we proposed a privacy-
preserving model verification mechanism based on HE and
2PC in Section IV. We conduct an experimental evaluation
to illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed
PoFL in Section V, and summarize the most related work in
Section VI. The whole paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. FRAMEWORK OF POFL
PoFL employs federated learning to solve realistic problems
with practical value to achieve consensus in Blockchain. In
our proposed PoFL framework, the problems such as image
recognition and semantic analysis are published as tasks on a
platform by requesters, along with the corresponding rewards
as incentives for mining. Considering that the amount of
reward can indirectly reflect the importance and urgency of
a task, we assume that the platform will choose the task with
the highest reward as the current problem which should be
solved by miners as a proof-of-work to reach consensus. In
the case of multiple tasks with the same highest reward, the
platform will select the earliest-arrived one.
As mentioned above, pooled-mining has become a devel-
opment trend in Blockchain currently, which has a similar
organization structure with federated learning. Therefore, we
investigate PoFL under the pooled-mining paradigm in this
paper, whose framework is shown in Figure 1.
According to Figure 1, pool members (miners) train ma-
chine learning (ML) models individually based on their pri-
vate data to obtain locally-computed updates, which will be
aggregated by the pool manager so as to achieve a high-
quality model. This process is named as federated mining.
After accuracy computation with the requester’s test data, each
pool manager packages transactions and generates a new block
containing the information needed for model verification. Once
receiving blocks, full nodes will identify the winner pool
through verifying model accuracy. The winner pool should
send his model to the requester, thus obtaining the accounting
right and the corresponding reward.
Fig. 1: Framework of PoFL.
To implement federated learning, miners in the same pool
will collectively train their models without any centralized
storage, which is coordinated by the pool manager. With
respect to the different storage characteristics of data, there
are various types of federated learning, such as horizontal
federated learning, vertical federated learning, and federated
transfer learning. Here we use horizontal federated learning
as an example to illustrate the federated mining process2, in
which the data of miners have the same kind of attributes
belonging to different individuals. It is shown in Figure 2 and
described as follows:
Fig. 2: Federated mining process.
1) The pool manager broadcasts an initial model as well as
a public key to the pool.
2) Each miner individually calculates the gradient value
based on the private training data and other information
received from the pool manager, which is encrypted
using the received public key.
3) The pool manager decrypts the locally-computed up-
dates sent by miners, aggregating them for establishing
a shared quality-improved model.
4) According to the deadline for submitting model accuracy
published by the platform, the pool manager determines
whether or not the next round of training is needed.
If not, federated mining is terminated. Otherwise, the
aggregated results will be sent back to each miner for
implementing Steps 2 and 3 repeatedly.
The sensitive training data could be either owned by the pool
members themselves or bought from some data providers. In
the latter case, the ownership and the usage right of the training
data are separated, posing a potential risk of privacy leakage.
To avoid this undesirable situation, we propose a reverse game-
based data trading mechanism in Section III, which leverages
the power of the market so that the lower risk of the pool
leaking data privacy, the higher the probability that the pool
can buy sensitive data, and the lower the price the pool needs
to pay, thus incentivizing the pool to behave well.
Once a pool accomplishes the training process, the pool
manager will calculate the accuracy of the final model based
on the test data provided by the requester. However, on one
hand, the requester’s test data may also be sensitive that are
2Other types of federated learning can also be implemented using our
proposed mechanism. We omit them due to the limited length of the paper.
not suitable to directly send to the pool or any third party for
accuracy verification due to the privacy leakage concern; on
the other hand, the pool manager is not willing to publish
the trained model explicitly before the end of consensus
competition to avoid being plagiarized by other competitors3.
To overcome the above challenges, we propose a privacy-
preserving model verification mechanism, which is detailed in
Section IV. Note that this mechanism can also be employed
by full nodes to verify the accuracy of all received models
with the help of the requester’s test data.
However, the current block structure does not contain any
model-related parameters, which makes the full nodes not able
to verify blocks to achieve the final consensus in Blockchain.
To solve this problem, we design a new block structure, which
is shown in Figure 3. The proposed block header keeps some
information in the existing block structure, such as the hash
value of the previous block header for maintaining the chain
structure, the Merkle tree root for securing transactions, the
block height counting from the first block, and the tamper-
resistant timestamp. In addition, in order to facilitate other
nodes verifying the accuracy of the model for each pool in
the network, we include task, Vm and accuracy in the POFL
block header. To be specific, task is the current executed one
by all miners, which is selected by the platform; Vm is the
information used for verifying model accuracy, detailed in
Section IV; and accuracy indicates the accuracy of the ML
model trained by the pool.
Fig. 3: Block structure of PoFL.
III. REVERSE GAME-BASED DATA TRADING MECHANISM
As mentioned above, when training data are bought from
some data providers, there is a potential risk of privacy leakage
due to the separation between the ownership and the usage
right of the data. An intuitive countermeasure is that data
providers encrypt their sensitive data and send them to the pool
for miners’ training. However, this will make the training time
too long, which further impacts the block generation rate and
overall performance of Blockchain. Take the training on the
encrypted MNIST dataset [9] as an example. It takes 570.11
seconds to run a single instance using CryptoNets model [10]
and nearly 57 hours to train two epochs using CryptoCNN
3In this case, a competitor may make an opportunistic choice–not training
model but submitting a result just slightly modified based on the contributions
published by others.
model [11]. Therefore, it is not practical to employ encrypted
data to train ML models for consensus in Blockchain.
To tackle the above challenge, we propose a reverse game-
based data trading mechanism, which takes advantage of
market power to make a rational pool maximize his utility
only when he trains the model without any data leakage. The
proposed mechanism leverages the reverse game to describe
the cooperative and conflictive relationship between the pool
and the data provider, which is an efficient tool to explore the
solutions for a class of private-information games. The pool
also has private information in reality, such as the net profit
of pooled-mining and the profit of disclosing data privacy.
This information is tightly related to the probability that the
pool discloses training data, which will never be told to the
data provider. Leveraging on the reverse game theory, the data
provider can determine the optimal trading probability and the
corresponding price without knowing the private information
of the pool, thus preserving the privacy of the training data
using the market as a tool.
In our mechanism, the data trading probability and its
purchase price depend on not only the private information
of the pool but also his reputation. The reputation of the
pool is calculated according to his data privacy disclosure
record. In order to establish a credible reputation mechanism,
we publish the data trading records between the pool and
the data provider on Blockchain. Due to the features of
transparency and traceability of Blockchain, once a piece of
data is disclosed, the malicious pool can be easily detected and
will be accountable for this information leak with a reduced
reputation. This further affects the data trading probability and
the purchase price of the pool in the future.
The reverse game-based data trading mechanism selects the
pool manager as the representative to conduct data trading with
data providers. This design is based on two considerations:
1) It can avoid the waste of resources caused by two pool
members in the same pool purchasing two copies of the same
data; 2) The pool manager is able to have the knowledge of
the data amount used for training in the entire pool, so that
the amount of training data for each miner can be distributed
as evenly as possible, which acts as the cornerstone of the
average income allocation after successful mining. Once the
data trading process is finished, the data provider directly sends
the data to the corresponding miner, which helps avoid the
communication overhead and possible privacy leakage risks
caused by the pool manager’s transmission4.
To optimize the incomplete-information game between the
data provider and the pool, the data provider is empowered to
design a game rule, which can enforce the pool to derive the
strategy based on his real private information. This requires the
game rule to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) principle,
implying that the game rule can enable the pool to obtain a
higher utility when he develops the strategy based on the real
4Each miner can acquire training data directly from one or more data
providers which are assigned by the pool manager according to the data
trading contracts, rather than obtain all data from the pool manager who need
to collect training data from all data providers.
private information rather than the fake one. In particular, the
expected utility (Upool) of the pool within a duration T is
defined as:
Upool =
∫ T
0
p · (Q+ c˜(r, V )−m−Ds)dt. (1)
In (1), Q is the legally expected net profit of a pool from this
data trading; c˜(r, V ) is the expected profit of leaking those
sensitive data, which is closely related to the pool’s reputation
r ∈ [0, 1] and the value (sensitivity) of the data, denoted by
V , so we define it as c˜(r, V ) = α˜(1− r) + β˜V with α˜, β˜ ≥ 0
being coefficients; m and Ds are respectively the bid of the
pool and the markup price proposed by the data provider, and
thus the final price of the traded data is m + Ds; p is the
probability that the pool can successfully purchase data from
the data provider, which can be obtained by
p = ε1r + ε2
Ds
D¯s
+ (1− ε1 − ε2)m
m¯
. (2)
In (2), m¯ and D¯s are respectively the highest values of m
and Ds in the recent rounds of data trading; ε1 and ε2 are
coefficients satisfying ε1, ε2 ≥ 0 and ε1 + ε2 ≤ 1. The above
equation indicates that the higher the reputation of the pool or
the higher the final price for the sensitive data, the more willing
the data provider to sell the data. Our mechanism requires
that at the beginning of the data trading process, the rule for
calculating the successful trading probability shown in (2) will
be informed to both parties, i.e., the data provider and the pool.
Similarly, the expected utility (Uprovider) of the data
provider within a duration T is defined as:
Uprovider =
∫ T
0
p · (m+Ds − c(r, V ))dt, (3)
In (3), c(r, V ) is the expected loss brought by sensitive data
leakage, defined as c(r, V ) = α(1 − r) + βV , which has the
similar definition with c˜(r, V ) and α, β ≥ 0 are coefficients.
With a higher value of the sensitive data, the markup price
proposed by the data provider, namely Ds, should also be
higher. So we define V = ηDs, with η > 0 being the
coefficient.
Fig. 4: Framework of reputation-based data trading mecha-
nism.
In the reverse game-based data trading mechanism, the
strategies of the pool and the data provider are respectively m
and Ds(m). In other words, the strategy of the data provider is
not a value but a rule, i.e., a function, which empowers the data
provider to force the pool to make the optimal bid based on his
real private information, such as the legally expected net profit
(Q) of a pool from this data trading and his expected profit
(c˜(r, V )) from leaking sensitive data. Our proposed mechanism
is illustrated in Fig. 4, which includes three phases:
• Phase 1: The data provider first designs an optimal game
rule D∗s(m) which can maximize her utility.
• Phase 2: Once receiving D∗s(m), the pool needs to decide
whether or not to accept the game rule. If yes, he will
calculate the optimal bid m∗ according to D∗s(m) for
maximizing his utility. Otherwise, he just ignores the
received message.
• Phase 3: If the data provider does not receive m∗ before
a given deadline, the trading negotiation is terminated.
Otherwise, she will calculate D∗s and thus the probability
of data trading in this round, i.e., p, can also be derived in
light of (2). Once the data provider and the pool reaches
an agreement on the data trading, the final price of the
training data is m∗ +D∗s .
In the following, we will introduce how to obtain the
optimal strategies of both parties, i.e., D∗s(m) and m
∗. Let
Fd = p ·(m+Ds−c(r, V )) = [ε1r+ε2DsD¯s +(1−ε1−ε2)
m
m¯ ] ·
[m+Ds−α(1−r)−βηDs], the integrand of (3). To maximize
Uprovider, we adopt the variational method. In detail, through
solving the Euler-Lagrange equation ∂Fd∂Ds − ddr ∂Fd∂D′s = 0 under
∂2Fd
∂D2s
= 2ε2(1−βη)
D¯s
< 0, we have
D∗s (m) =
ε2[m− α(1− r)] + (1− βη)D¯s[ε1r + (1− ε1 − ε2)mm¯ ]
2ε2(βη − 1) .
(4)
Similarly, let the integrand of (1) be Fp = p ·(Q+ c˜(r, V )−
m−Ds) = [ε1r+ ε2D
∗
s
D¯s
+ (1− ε1 − ε2)mm¯ ] · [Q+ α˜(1− r) +
β˜ηD∗s −m −D∗s ]. The optimal strategy of the pool can also
be calculated through the variational method. That is,
m∗ =
A0A2A3ε1r + (A0A2ε2 + D¯sA
2
0A1)[Q+ α˜(1− r)]− ε1rD¯sA20
2ε2A0A2 + 2A1A20D¯s − 2ε2(β˜η − 1)A22 − 2A0A1A2A3
+
[2ε2A2A3 +A0A1A3 −A0ε2][(1− βη)D¯sε1r − ε2α(1− r)]
2ε2A0A2 + 2A1A20D¯s − 2ε2(β˜η − 1)A22 − 2A0A1A2A3
,
(5)
in which
A0 = 2ε2(βη − 1), A1 = (1− ε1 − ε2) 1
m¯
,
A2 = ε2 + (1− βη)(1− ε1 − ε2)D¯s
m¯
, A3 = D¯s(β˜η − 1).
Theorem III.1. When 1 − βη < 0, D∗s(m) in (4) is the
equilibrium strategy of the data provider.
Proof. According to the variational method, when ∂
2Fd
∂D2s
−
d
dt
∂2Fd
∂Ds∂D
′
s
≤ 0 and ∂2Fd
∂(D′s)2
≤ 0, Fd can be maximized.
Because Fd is not related to D
′
s,
d
dt
∂2Fd
∂Ds∂D
′
s
= 0 and ∂
2Fd
∂(D′s)2
=
0. Thus, the condition of maximizing Fd is simplified to
∂2Fd
∂D2s
≤ 0, implying 2ε2(1−βη)
D¯s
≤ 0 should be met. However,
if 2ε2(1−βη)
D¯s
= 0, D∗s(m) in (4) will be meaningless, so
∂2Fd
∂D2s
= 2ε2(1−βη)
D¯s
< 0 should be satisfied. Due to ε2 > 0 and
D¯s > 0, when 1− βη < 0 is satisfied, Fd can be maximized.
Thus, the theorem is proved.
By the similar way, we can obtain the following theorem:
Theorem III.2. When 1−β˜η < 0, m∗ in (5) is the equilibrium
strategy of the pool.
Theorem III.3. The game rule D∗s(m) designed by the data
provider is incentive-compatible.
Proof. We assume that Qˆ and ˜̂c(r, V ) are the fake private
information, based on which a dishonest strategy mˆ is re-
ported to the data provider. Due to Qˆ 6= Q and ˜̂c(r, V ) 6=
c˜(r, V ), mˆ 6= m∗(Q, c˜(r, V )). Because Upool is maximized
only when his strategy is m∗(Q, c˜(r, V )) according to (5),
Upool(mˆ(Qˆ, ˜̂c(r, V ))) ≤ Upool(m∗(Q, c˜(r, V )). Thus, the pool
can maximize his utility only if he reports the strategy based
on the true privacy information. In other words, the game rule
is incentive compatible.
The game rule satisfying the incentive-compatibility princi-
ple drives the pool to calculate m∗ based on his real private
information. As the strategy of the data provider is a function
of m∗, i.e., Ds(m∗), it will also be derived based on real
private information. This is equivalent to the situation where
both the pool and the data provider make the optimal strategies
for maximizing their utilities based on the global information
known by two sides. In addition, the incentive-compatibility
of the game rule enforces both m∗ and Ds(m∗) to reveal the
risk of the data privacy leakage in this round of data trading.
This is because they are calculated based on the real private
information of the pool, i.e., his legally expected net profit
(Q) from this data trading and expected extra profit (c˜(r, V ))
from leaking sensitive data, while both rational players in
the reverse game are utility-driven, making m∗ and Ds(m∗)
closely related to whether the data traded in this round will
be leaked or not. Therefore, the calculation of successful
trading probability in (2) can reduce or even prevent privacy
leakage behavior since it depends on not only the historical
data privacy leakage behavior of the pool but also the privacy
leakage risk in this round.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MODEL VERIFICATION
MECHANISM
As we mentioned above, after each epoch of training, the
model accuracy should be calculated based on the test data of
the requester. However, on one hand, the test data may be sen-
sitive so that the requester is not willing to share them; on the
other hand, the trained model should not be published before
the end of consensus competition to avoid being plagiarized
by other competitors. To address this challenge, we design a
privacy-preserving model verification mechanism to verify the
accuracy of the trained model without information disclosure
from either the requester or the pool. This mechanism can also
be used by full nodes to verify the accuracy of models when
receiving blocks from pools.
The accuracy of the trained model is evaluated by the
number of the same predicted labels as the actual ones.
Hence, the model verification in our mechanism is divided
into two parts, i.e., label prediction and label comparison. To
illustrate how our mechanism accomplishes label prediction
and comparison, we take the deep feedforward network model5
as an example, which is a typical type of deep learning network
structure.
A. Homomorphic encryption-based label prediction
According to the design of the deep feedforward network,
the value of a node i in each layer is calculated based on the
inputs x = {xj} from the last layer, which is f(x) = σ(zi).
Here, σ(·) represents the sigmoid function and zi = xTwi+bi,
where wi = {wij} is the weight vector and bi is the bias of
node i, with j denoting all nodes in the last layer. Particularly,
the input of the first layer is the test data of the requester
A = [aij ]I×M , where aij is the j-th attribute in the i-th row
of data with 1 ≤ i ≤ I and 1 ≤ j ≤M − 1 with I indicating
how many pieces6 of test data that the requester owns and
M − 1 denoting the number of attributes in each piece of
data; while the last item of each piece of test data, i.e., aiM
(1 ≤ i ≤ I), is the label.
Since A = [aij ]I×M is sensitive for the requester, to avoid
leaking A in the process of calculating the accuracy of models,
an effective method is secure two-party computation (2PC).
For example, Rouhani et al. [12] realized privacy-preserving
label prediction utilizing 2PC. However, the communication
and computation complexity of directly using 2PC is too high,
making the efficiency of label prediction relatively low. To
address this problem, we propose the homomorphic encryption
(HE)-based label prediction. In detail, the requester only needs
to send the encrypted A, denoted as [〈aij〉]I×M , as well as
the corresponding public key to the pool, who can use HE
to calculate the outputs of the second layer, i.e., f(x), based
on the first (input) layer of encrypted data attributes. This is
because the HE technology can output the desired calculation
results in plaintext with operations on the ciphertext. Assuming
that the number of nodes in the first layer is the same as the
number of attributes, i.e., M − 1, and the number of nodes in
the second layer is represented by K. Take the first piece of
data as an example, we can calculate the value of node k in
the second layer as:
〈zk〉 =
M−1∑
j=1
(〈a1j〉 ⊗ 〈wkj〉 ⊕ 〈bk〉), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, (6)
in which ⊕ and ⊗ are the corresponding computation of +
and × under HE, and ∑ is also operated with ⊕ calculation.
In order to prevent disclosing the real value of zk (1 ≤ k ≤
K) from the requester, the pool masks them with a random
5Other models can be processed in the same way.
6For instance, one piece of data in a medical dataset denotes the data of
one patient.
vector [hk]K , which can be encrypted to [〈hk〉]K with the
requester’s public key. So 〈zik + hk〉 is calculated as follows:
〈zk + hk〉 = 〈zk〉 ⊕ 〈hk〉 , 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (7)
Once the requester receives 〈zk + hk〉, she decrypts them with
the private key and sends back zk + hk (1 ≤ k ≤ K) in
plaintext to the pool, which helps to calculates σ(zk) serving
as the input of the next layer in the deep feedforward network.
After that, the rest layers in the deep feedforward network
model can be calculated locally by the pool with no need to
interact with the requester until deriving the predicted labels.
B. 2PC-based label comparison
After label prediction, label comparison starts, where the
accuracy of the model can be derived through counting the
number of the same predicted label a′iM as the actual one aiM
(1 ≤ i ≤ I). However, there still exists the privacy protection
issue in this process. On one hand, the pool is not willing to
disclose the predicted label a′iM since the trained model might
be inferred from this side information. On the other hand,
the actual label aiM is sensitive data for the requester as we
mentioned above. To overcome this challenge, we propose a
2PC-based label comparison. The main reason of using 2PC
lies in that it is easy to employ a garbled circuit (GC) to
describe the label comparison process so that this process can
be completed efficiently, since the efficiency of 2PC is closely
related to the GC construction in both the communication and
computation complexity [13] [14] [15].
To realize the proposed method, we firstly design the
boolean circuit for comparison as shown in Fig. 5. The inputs
of the circuit are a′iM and aiM , 1 ≤ i ≤ I , both of which are
assumed to be l-bit, and the output is the total number N of
correct predictions. Based on our circuit design, if aiM = a′iM ,
the statistical total number N of correct prediction adds 1.
Otherwise, this is an erroneous one and N adds 0. Even though
the accuracy should be calculated by N/I , we use the total
number of correct predictions N to denote it for simplicity
since I is stable in one round of calculation, verification and
comparison.
The cost of GC is linearly correlated with the number of
garbled gates [16]. Taking advantage of the free-XOR technol-
ogy [14], XOR can be free, implying that XOR does not need
associated garbled tables and the corresponding hashing or
symmetric key operations. Therefore, a direct way to improve
the performance is reducing the number of costly garbled
gates, namely those non-XOR gates. In detail, to compare two
values, a SUB gate is supposed to be exploited, which is a non-
XOR gate. In our scheme, we replace the SUB gate with a
combination of an XOR gate and a NOT gate shown in Fig. 6.
Note that the NOT gate is also free since it can be implemented
using an XOR gate with one of the inputs as constant 1. We
summarize the number of non-free binary gates of our circuit
in Table I, where the n-bit Adder denotes all the adders from
1 bit to dlogIe − 1 bit, namely n ∈ {1, · · · , dlogIe − 1}.
After the fundamental construction of the boolean circuit,
we employ JustGarble [13] for garbling, due to its optimization
Fig. 5: Circuit for label comparison.
Fig. 6: Optimization of the non-free SUB gate.
in high efficiency, proven security and garbled row reduction.
In short, to garble a circuit is to encrypt the inputs and
outputs of the gates in the circuit and disorder the permutation
of them. We omit the description of detailed operation for
garbling because they are simple variable operations like a
couple of shifts. It is worth mentioning that the time cost of
the above garbling way is in the level of nanoseconds per
gate, and the size of garbled tables is 101 order of magnitude,
which is efficient enough to meet the requirement for model
verification.
Note that GC is finally composed of garbled tables, which
gives the keys used to encrypt the inputs and output of each
gate. After constructing GC, the pool sends it to the requester
along with the corresponding keys of predicted labels, denoted
as w(a′iM ) (1 ≤ i ≤ I). In order to verify the model accuracy
without leaking the privacy of each other, the oblivious transfer
(OT) [17] [18] is adopted, by which the requester can only
find out the corresponding keys of her actual labels w(aiM )
(1 ≤ i ≤ I) without any knowledge on the predicted labels,
so neither the pool can know anything about the actual labels.
After receiving the keys of inputs a′iM and aiM , the requester
can calculate the corresponding garbled encrypted-output and
evaluate GC to find out the actual output 〈N〉, which is the
encrypted value of N . Once receiving 〈N〉, the pool decrypts
it and packages it in the block as accuracy.
It is worth noting that our model verification mechanism
can also be utilized by full nodes to verify a model’s accu-
TABLE I: Number of Non-Free Gates
Gate OR n-bit Adder All Gates
Number I IdlogIe2 I +
IdlogIe
2
racy. Therefore, the encrypted weights and biases need to be
packaged in the block with GC. All of these encrypted data
are denoted by Vm, which are stored in the block header as
we mentioned in Section II.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed PoFL through
simulations based on synthetic and real-world data as follows.
A. Data trading
In this subsection, we study the impact of some key
parameters in our proposed data trading mechanism. Firstly,
we study the impact of the pool’s reputation r. Here we set
ε1 = ε2 = 0.4, η = 1.8, α = α˜ = 1.5, β = β˜ = 1, and
Q = 8 to satisfy Theorems III.1 and III.27. As shown in Fig.
7(a), when r, the maximum utilities of both the pool and the
data provider quadratically increase. The similar trend happens
on the probability that the pool can purchase training data as
illustrated in Fig. 7(b). The reason behind these facts is that
the higher r will bring a higher data trading probability p in
light of (2) and a lower expected loss brought by sensitive data
leakage c(r, V ) according to (3), which together contribute to
the increase of utilities for both sides.
Then we examine the impact of the pool’s legally expected
net profit Q, which is reported in Fig. 7(c)(d). Note that the
parameter setting here is the same as the above ones except
the varying Q and r = 0.5. It can be observed from figures
that both maximum utilities and the data trading probability
increase with Q. This is because the larger Q, the higher the
data price that the pool is willing to provide, which not only
increases p as defined in (2) but also improves the utilities for
both sides due to (1) and (3).
Next, we evaluate the impacts of α˜ and β˜ on data trading,
which directly reflect the expected profit of leaking private
data, i.e., c˜(r, V ). With the same ε1, ε2 mentioned above,
we use η = 1.8, β = β˜ = 1, Q = 20 in Fig. 8(a)(b) and
η = 0.5, α = α˜ = 5, Q = 20 in Fig. 8(c)(d). As shown in
Fig. 8(a)(c), with the increase of α˜ and β˜, which is equivalent
to the increase of c˜(r, V ), the maximum utility of the pool
increases due to his selling of sensitive data, while the utility
of the data provider decreases because of her increasing loss
brought by data leakage. According to Fig. 8(b)(d), one can tell
that as the extra profit that the pool can gain from leaking data
increases, the probability he can obtain the data is decreasing
significantly, which can act as a reverse driving force for the
legal behavior of the pool.
7Other parameters satisfying requirements are also evaluated, which
presents similar performance trend. So we omit these results to avoid
redundancy.
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Fig. 7: Impacts of r and Q on data trading.
1 2 3 4 5 60
5
10
15
20
α˜
u
ti
li
ty
 
 
maxUprovider
maxUpool
(a) Utility vs. α˜
1 2 3 4 5 60
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
α˜
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
(b) Probability vs. α˜
0.5 1 1.50
5
10
15
20
β˜
u
ti
li
ty
 
 
maxUprovider
maxUpool
(c) Utility vs. β˜
0.5 1 1.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
β˜
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
(d) Probability vs. β˜
Fig. 8: Impacts of α˜ and β˜ on data trading.
B. Federated mining
We simulate the federated mining process based on the
CIFAR-10 dataset [19] with 50,000 training samples which
is composed of 10 classes of 32× 32 images with three RGB
channels. Here we set that the initial model selected by the
pool manager is AlexNet [20]. Even though there are other
models with higher accuracy like more than 96.53% [21],
AlexNet can function well as an example in our proposed
mechanism. In fact, how to select the initial model is out of
the scope of our work.
To be specific, we take the linear regression training as an
example8. We use Batch Gradient Descent (BGD) to optimize
the parameters of the model. Assuming that the total number
of miners contributing to federated mining in the pool is
K and the learning rate is ζ. Fig. 9(a) illustrates, when the
learning rate ζ changes, the convergence speed to achieve
certain accuracy is different but it is not the case where the
higher the learning rate the better. This is because ζ indicates
the length of step in the direction of gradient. If ζ is too small,
the training process can be time-consuming; while if it is too
large, it may cause excessive loss as the gradient obtained from
the training data is an approximate value of the real one.
Assuming that the whole dataset is evenly distributed among
miners in the pool and each miner has the same proportion S
of the dataset, which is equivalent to 1K . It turns out that the
larger the portion of data each miner owns, the faster to reach
the highest accuracy, shown in Fig. 9(b). This is because with
more data, the calculated gradient will be closer to the real
value for the fastest gradient descent.
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Fig. 9: Experiment results of federated mining.
C. Accuracy calculation
After federated mining, the model of each pool is translated
and encrypted to calculate the accuracy based on the privacy-
preserving model verification mechanism. We conduct the
numerical analysis on both computation and communication
cost of HE and GC construction affected by data quantity.
We first study the communication cost between the pool
manager and the requester, changing with data quantity. As-
suming that there are four layers with 256, 16, 16, 10 nodes
respectively in the model, the communication cost of HE
and OT of GC is shown in Fig. 10(a). As we can see, the
communication cost of HE is almost linear to the quantity of
data. This is because the exchanged data are 〈aij〉, 〈zk + hk〉
and zk + hk, which are linearly increasing with data quantity.
In addition, the communication cost of OT in GC is also
increasing with data quantity since it is related to the number
of garbled gates. According to Table I, the number of garbled
gates is changing with I × dlog(I)e, where I is exactly the
data quantity.
Then we present the computation costs of both HE and GC
in Fig. 10(b). During HE, both the costs of the pool and the
requester increase linearly with data quantity but the cost of the
pool increases faster than that of the requester. This is because
8Other training functions can be implemented in a similar way.
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Fig. 10: Experimental results of the model verification mech-
anism.
the requester can complete a lot of calculation offline, such as
the encryption of the test data, then the online calculation only
refers to the decryption of 〈zk + hk〉; while for the pool, he
has to calculate a lot of intermediate results, such as zk and hk,
which costs him more compared to that of the requester when
data quantity increases. While the time cost of GC consists
of two parts, garbling the circuit of the pool and evaluating
GC of the requester. We use the best PRM-based garbling
scheme of JustGarble system called GaX and our processor
runs at 3.20 GHz [13]. The consumption of GC construction
is proportional to the number of non-free gates in the circuit,
which is also changing with I × dlog(I)e.
D. Accuracy verification
When blocks are generated, it comes to the accuracy ver-
ification process of full nodes. The time for full nodes to
verify accuracy and reach a consensus is very significant. The
shorter the time, the better the efficiency and the higher the
security. In our proposed mechanism, the main time spent
on verification is accuracy sorting and testing. The time of
sorting is based on the operating speed and the number of
blocks. For the operating speed, we take ASIC in [22] as an
example. Referring to the average sorting time of ASIC, the
time consumption increases with the number of models as
shown in Fig. 11(a). While for the number of received blocks,
according to the statistics of Bitcoin [23], there are 9,364 nodes
at present. Thus, the time of sorting all the accuracy of received
blocks in our system will not exceed 60 microseconds for full
nodes.
After sorting the accuracy of models in a descending order,
full nodes test these models from the first one. If the model
with the highest accuracy is verified to be true, there is no
need to test other models. Otherwise, the second one will be
tested until finding the first model with verified accuracy being
the same as that stored in the block header. The quantity of
our test data is set as 10,000. The average time for full nodes
to test the accuracy of models is between 1.65 seconds and
1.7 seconds as shown in Fig. 11(b). In addition to the time of
sorting, all the time we need is no more than 2 seconds.
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VI. RELATED WORK
Many attempts have been made to find valuable work as
a substitute of puzzles in PoW, which should be difficult to
solve but easy to verify. Initially, researchers take a small step
forward replacing the nonce with some mathematic problems.
Primecoin [4] requires miners to find long prime chains for
the proof of work. There are many similar problems [24], such
as orthogonal vectors, all-pairs shortest paths problem and
rSUM, which requires to find r numbers to have their sum be
zero. However, there is no significant practical value in solving
these mathematical problems at the cost of ridiculously large
amounts of energy.
Next, more diverse and improved attempts are proposed.
In PoX (proof of exercise) [5], scientific computation matrix-
based problems are sent by employers to a third-party platform
where miners select tasks to solve. Permacoin [25] proposes
PoR (proof of retrievability) to investigate the storage space
and memory for a file or file fragment, where the mining is not
associated with computation but storage resources. PieceWork
[26] reuses the wasted work for additional goals such as spam
prevention and DoS mitigation by outsourcing.
In recent, the combination of deep learning and Blockchain
has appeared. A substitution of PoW named PoDL (proof
of deep learning) [7] first uses deep learning for Blockchain
maintenance instead of useless hash calculation, which only
needs to add some new components to the block header and
thus can be applied to the current cryptocurrency systems.
However, the user needs to provide a complete training dataset
for model training and test datasets for verification to all
miners, which sacrifices data privacy and may frustrate the data
provider to apply Blockchain. Besides, image segmentation is
employed in [6], which defines the segmentation model as
proof. Furthermore, Coin.AI [27] proposes a proof-of-storage
scheme to reward users for providing storage for deep learning
models.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel energy-recycling consen-
sus algorithm named PoFL, where the cryptographic puzzles
in PoW is replaced with federated learning tasks. To realize
PoFL, a general framework is introduced and a new PoFL
block structure is designed for supporting block verification.
To guarantee the privacy of training data, a reverse game-based
data trading mechanism is proposed, which takes advantage
of market power to make a rational pool maximize his utility
only when he trains the model without any data leakage, thus
further motivating pools to behave well. In addition, a privacy-
preserving model verification mechanism is designed to verify
the accuracy of a trained model while preserving the privacy
of the task requester’s test data as well as avoiding the pool’s
submitted model to be plagiarized by others, which employs
homomorphic encryption and secure two-party computation in
label prediction and comparison, respectively. Extensive sim-
ulations based on synthetic and real-world data demonstrate
the effectiveness and efficiency of PoFL.
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